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SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT
This brief isfiledpursuant to this Court's order of December 28, 2000.
SUPPLEMENTARY ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED
APPELLANT WAS INDIGENT AND REFUSED TO PROVIDE
HIM WITH COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL, THUS
VIOLATING HIS RIGHT TO COURT APPOINTED
COUNSEL UNDER UTAH LAW AND THE SIXTH AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION.
The trial court refused to appoint counsel for Defendant Wallberg in the instant case,
believing his income was adequate for Defendant to hire his own counsel. Defendant indicated that
his income was barely adequate to provide Defendant with food, shelter, and medication for the
condition for which he received Social Security Disability income, which cost him three to four
hundred dollars per month. (Transcript, Initial Appearance, P8 L9). The Court indicated "Well, a
lot of legal counsel will take a lean [sic] on-on your check or whatever to-to see that it's paid.
There-there's procedures that you can agree to that you can make-that you can make contractual
agreements with counsel so that they're-so that they're assured of some payment." (Transcript,
Initial Appearance, P14 LI9).
First, an attorney, like any other creditor, cannot place a lien against a Social Security check,
but can only hope to attach that money after it is deposited into a bank account. If the recipient has
no bank account, there can be no attachment of the funds. Secondly, while there are attorneys who
will work, on credit, for a criminal client who may probably end up in prison, finding one is another
matter. Additionally, under current Federal law, an incarcerated person may lose all Federal benefit
-1-

payments during his incarceration, thus e* en had Defendant been able to persuade an attorney to
represent him and take payments, he would likely have lost his sole source of income once
imprisoned.
Defendant was also at a disadvantage regarding an attempt to locate an attorney who might
have represented him without a retainer, as he was at the time incarcerated, and the Court refused
to lower his bail beyond the already-reduced $2,500.
Thus, with the approximately $600 on his person when booked into the jail, (Transcript,
Initial Appearance, P6, LI 1-22), Defendant was unable to post bond which would have given him
the freedom to query attorneys and agencies who might have provided him with representation, and
was unable to hire an attorney from the jail with a mere $600 to offer as a retainer, which money was
in the custody of the jail and unavailable to Defendant in any event. (Note: inmates generally may
only make collect calls from within the facility, which makes it virtually impossible to contact
offices where they are unknown.)
The trial Court expressed its opinion that, while Mr. Wallberg may have had inadequate
funds for basic necessities," [TJhat's the same that all of us suffer through....'" (Transcript, Initial
Hearing, P14 L10)
When it was pointed out to the Court that the same Court had appointed the public defender
in the past, the Court stated " I think that I did that as, ah, facilitative and reserved the right to-to
assess some or all of the attorneys fees in the event that... it's determined that you are not eligible
for 100 percent court-appointed counsel. And I would be willing to do that again, under these
circumstances . . . . " (Transcript, Initial Hearing, P9 LI 1)
-2-

The Court did not state what the guidelines for appointing counsel were at the time. There
is a brief mention, by the Public Defender, Mr. Allred, that "Well it's still-we're still two or
three-three hundred dollars past the limit on this count...." (Transcript, Initial Hearing, PI3 L 12)
At no time during the hearing did anyone refer to a guideline or clarify the "limit" referred to by the
Public Defender.
Interestingly, the Court apparently initially was inclined to appoint counsel for Defendant
(Transcript, Initial hearing, PI3 L 3) until the Public Defender argued against the appointment and
ultimately convinced the Court that Defendant was not entitled to his services. (Transcript, Initial
Hearing, P14,L12).
In a perfect world, Defendant would indeed have been able to locate an attorney who would
represent him at trial on a felony criminal charge, for little or no money up front, and a promise of
payments, even in a rural area with few attorneys. However the reality was then, and is now, that
such attorneys are practically non-existent unless one has a sensational case in which an organization
such as the ACLU is interested.
State v Vincent 883 P.2d 278 (Ut. 1994) was the standard for determining indigency at the
time the instant case was before the District Court, in which the Court determined that the trial
court's decision as to whether or not the facts qualify a defendant as indigent, is reviewable for
correctness.. The Utah Supreme Court in Vincent set forth a list of factors that should be considered
in deciding indigency matters, which had been listed earlier in Kelsey v Hanson, 818 P.2d 590 (Ut.
App. 1990) which included:
1.

Employment status and earning capacity;
-3-

2.

Financial aid from family or friends;

3.

Financial assistance from state and federal programs;

4.

A defendant's necessary living expenses and liabilities;

5.

A defendant's unencumbered assets or disposition thereof; and

6.

The borrowing capacity of a Defendant.
At Appellant's initial appearance, the Court merely inquired,firstas to when Appellant was

last employed (Transcript, Initial Hearing, P5 L7), and then as to whether or not Appellant was
supporting his children from his Social Security payment of $928 per month (Transcript, Initial
Hearing, P5 LI7; P7, L6-25; P8, LI-8). Once the Court determined that the children received
separate payments, the Court refused to appoint counsel for Appellant.
Utah Code Annotated §77-32-202(3)(ii) defines indigency as having an income level at or
below 150% of the United States poverty level. Subparagraph (i) defines indigency as when a person
lacks sufficient means to provide for the payment of legal counsel and all other necessary expenses
of representation without depriving himself of food, shelter, clothing, and other necessities.
The 1995the United States poverty level for one individual was $7470. 150% of that amount
is $ 11,205. Appellant's income at that time was $928 per month, or $11,136. Had the statute been
in place at the time of Appellant's hearing, the Court would have bene obligated to provide him with
counsel, even without an inquiry into other matters.
Although Vincent concerned the right to counsel on appeal, the standards for determining
indigency set forth therein can certainly be extended to the right to counsel at trial. The Utah
Supreme Court, although reversing Vincent, agreed that the factorsfirstset forth in Kelsey and then
-4-

used in Vincent were useful in evaluating indigency.
The trial Court failed to inquire about Appellant's situation beyond the amount of his
monthly Social Security check and whether he was supporting his children on his $928 monthly
check.
It appears from the initial hearing that both the Court and the Public Defender simply did not
want to deal with Appellant. The prosecutor, the Public Defender and the Court focused on the
number of Appellant's children, where they lived, and whether Appellant's monthly income was
being used to support them. When Appellant advised the Court that he had three to four hundred
dollars per month expenses for medications, (Transcript, Initial Hearing, P8 LI6), the Court
brushed it aside with a comment that the Court believed Appellant's income precluded appointment
of counsel. (Transcript, Initial Hearing, P8 L16)
At no time during the hearing did the Court, the prosecutor, or the Public Defender make
reference to any standards for determining indigency. The sole inquiry, aside from the query
regarding how Appellant's children were supported, was when Appellant was last employed.
(Transcript, Initial Hearing, P5 L7). No inquiry was made as to living costs for Appellant, his living
situation vis a vis whether he paid rent or lived with someone, what he paid - or did not pay - for
utilities, what his monthly medical costs were. When Appellant tried to provide this information to
the Court (Transcript, Initial Hearing, P14 L7), the Court's response was "[Tjhat's the same that all
of us suffer through

" (Transcript, Initial Hearing, P14 L10).
CONCLUSION

The standard of review for conclusions as to whether empirical faxcts qualify a defendant as
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indigent, is reviewable for correctness pursuant to State v Vincent, 883 P.2d 278 (Ut. 1994). The
trial court's denial of counsel to Appellant was clearly error in that the factors set forth in Vincent
and later in Kelsey were largely ignored by the Court, and the Court failed to make findings as to
why it denied counsel to appellant other than a vague reference to the Court's belief that Appellant
was not entitled to counsel.
RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant's conviction should be set aside, counsel should be
appointed to represent Appellant, and a new trial should be granted.

DATED February 9, 2001.
' Ms. Gene S. Byrge &
Attorney for Appellant
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